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Entrepreneurial Overconfidence and its Impact Upon Performance: 
 
Abstract 
A hubris theory of entrepreneurship suggests that financial forecasts are often informed 
by the use of heuristic methods prone to overconfidence. While overconfidence can be 
advantageous during the start-up phase, it is also linked to overoptimistic forecasts, non-
optimal outcomes and firm failure. This paper uses a data set from 203 micro and small 
firms operating in North West Italy where overconfidence is measured as the difference 
between budget estimates and actual results for Earnings before Interest, Taxes, 
Depreciation, and Amortization (EBITDA), owners’ equity and borrowing costs. These 
measures are employed to identify the extent of overconfidence by entrepreneurs in 
their financial forecasts and to analyse any relationship between overconfidence and the 
characteristics of the entrepreneur and the firm. A further probit analysis is employed to 
investigate any association between overconfident financial forecasts and subsequent 
firm failure. The results are consistent with the hypotheses, suggesting that the majority 
of entrepreneurs are prone to overconfident budgetary forecasts that are directly 
associated with firm failure.  Such overconfidence is mitigated by an entrepreneur’s 
level of educational attainment and the use of budgetary controls.  
Keywords: overconfidence, entrepreneurial attitudes, forecasting, hubris, failure, 
heuristics, performance 
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Entrepreneurial Overconfidence and its Impact Upon Performance 
 
Introduction 
The budgeting process underpins an entrepreneur’s ability to successfully start and 
develop a business as forecasting establishes expectations and the resources required to 
meet such expectations. Inaccurate forecasts can therefore lead to capital investment 
losses, high financial and inventory costs, poor customer service and inefficient 
utilization of productive resources (Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer 1999). Despite its 
contribution, very few studies consider the accuracy of forecasts in an entrepreneurial 
context, or the effect this might have on firm performance. Smith, Herbig, Milewicz and 
Golden, (1996) note a high degree of subjectivity in the forecasts performed by 
entrepreneurs which they identify as being based upon less complex quantitative 
forecasting techniques than those used in larger firms. It is suggested (Cassar and 
Gibson 2007) that this subjectivity and use of less complex techniques can induce 
entrepreneurs to make forecasts that are too optimistic. This is consistent with hubris 
theory that highlights how overconfidence not only encourages entrepreneurs to start-up 
firms but to also pursue challenging growth strategies, often in hostile environments 
with insufficient resources (Hayward, Shepherd and Griffin 2006). 
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Overconfidence is defined as a cognitive bias that overestimates the probability of a 
positive outcome to an event compared to the probability of experiencing a negative 
outcome from the same event (Busenitz and Barney 1994; Ucbasaran, Westhead, 
Wright, and Flores, 2010; Tipu and Arain 2011). The notion of overconfidence is 
informed by the literature in the field of cognitive psychology where the term 
“entrepreneurial cognition” is used to describe the way in which entrepreneurs think and 
behave (Baron 2004; Mitchell, Busenitz, Lant, McDougall, Morse, Brock Smith, 2002). 
The advantages and disadvantages associated with an overconfident attitude have been 
the subject of numerous studies in business research (see Alvarez and Busenitz 2001 
and Hmieleski and Baron 2009). While overconfidence can potentially add value during 
the often-difficult start-up stage (Koellinger, Minniti and Schade 2007; Robinson and 
Marino 2015), it may also induce entrepreneurs to establish firms without sufficient 
capital (Hayward, Shepherd and Griffin 2006), overestimate potential (Cassar and 
Gibson 2007) and fail to recognise poor performance (Shepherd, Wiklund and Haynie 
2009). This article investigates the overoptimistic biases in the context of established 
firms. 
Considerable literature exists on the potential for entrepreneurs to be overconfident in 
their expectations of firm performance but the majority of this evidence is derived from 
self-reported attitudinal surveys. In addition, this literature has offered no empirical 
evidence that identifies an association between overconfidence and firm performance 
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and only limited information on the attributes of the entrepreneur, or firm, that may lead 
to such behaviour (Ucbasuran et al. 2010). Using published data on the budget forecasts 
and actual results made available for 2012 by a unique sample of 203 Italian micro and 
small enterprises, this article addresses two research questions. Are entrepreneurial or 
firm characteristics related to overconfident attitudes as exhibited in the financial 
estimations of small firms?  Is overconfidence associated with a small firm failure?  To 
address these questions, a novel measure for overconfidence is adopted, computed as 
the variance between actual and estimated values of three economic indicators: 
EBITDA (Earnings Before Interest, Tax, Depreciation and Amortization), equity and 
borrowing costs, derived from comparisons between a firm’s balance sheets and 
financial forecasts over time. We argue that systematic, inflated financial predictions of 
firm performance signal overconfidence and we operationalise the overconfidence 
construct as the difference between budgeted and actual performance (Cassar and 
Gibson 2007; Markovitch, Steckel, Michaut, Philip and Tracy, 2015). 
 
Theoretical framework 
A hubris theory of entrepreneurship models how more overconfident individuals are 
more likely to start and develop new ventures and how such ventures are also more 
likely to fail (Hayward, Shepherd and Griffin 2006). Overconfidence is conceptualized 
as the overestimation of an event having a positive outcome (Busenitz and Barney 1994; 
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Tipu and Arain 2011) and has been researched with reference to entrepreneurs (Forbes 
2005; Ucbasaran et al. 2010; Robinson and Marino 2015) and managers (Sautner and 
Weber 2009). The analysis of an entrepreneur’s psychological behaviour suggests that 
overconfidence in beliefs and decision-making (Busenitz and Barney 1997) leads to 
idealistic and unfeasible forecasts (Cassar and Gibson 2007). Such forecasts often rely 
upon heuristic methods used to make sense of the complex environments faced by 
entrepreneurs (Baron 1998). Heuristics refer to any approach to problem solving or 
learning that employs a practical, simplistic and timesaving method not guaranteed to be 
optimal, but regarded as sufficient for the achievement of immediate goals. One non-
optimal outcome associated with the use of heuristics is the potential for an 
overconfident attitude to affect the forecasting process. If entrepreneurs are 
overoptimistic, resource allocation decisions may be compromised, leading to a 
negative impact upon business performance (Dawson and Henley 2012) and, 
potentially, business failure (De Meza and Southey 1996; Koellinger, Minniti, and 
Schade 2007). It is recognized that failure can occur when a venture does not meet the 
expectations of the entrepreneur but, for the purposes of this article, we investigate 
economic failure identified by insolvency
1
 (Ciampi and Gordini 2009; Ucbasaran et al. 
                                                 
1
 In the Italian legal environment the term “bancarotta semplice” refers to an individual and 
not to a business. The Italian “Legge fallimentare” (Insolvency Law) sets a threshold on the 
entrepreneur’s or firm’s revenues, assets and liabilities to limit the applicability of the “failure” 
procedures. When the failure requirements are not met, an entrepreneur or a firm incapable of 
meeting its financial obligations is said to be “insolvent”. To avoid confusion, in this paper the 
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2010; Wennberg and DeTienne 2014; Jenkins and McKelvie 2016). While the closure 
of the activity may arise from a range of factors (for a discussion see Carter and Van 
Auken 2006), the emphasis in this article is on the role overconfidence can play in the 
demise of the firm. 
 
Hypotheses development 
Although hubris theory is well developed in the extant literature, the reason why 
entrepreneurs appear to exhibit more overconfidence than non-entrepreneurs remains 
open to debate. One explanation focuses upon the entrepreneur and suggests the act of 
entrepreneurship attracts individuals that are less rational and more informal in their 
thinking and, therefore, also more susceptible to the use of heuristics in decision-
making (Busenitz and Barney 1997). This study draws from previous literature 
(Levesque and Minniti 2006; Lovallo and Kahneman 2003; Morrell and Ezingeard 
2002) in employing personal and firm variables to identify factors that influence the 
level of entrepreneurial overconfidence. Personal variables include the entrepreneur’s 
gender, age, experience and level of education and firm variables include organizational 
structure and the adoption of any forms of automated information systems. Accordingly, 
this study presents two groups of hypotheses. The first group (H1, in its multiple 
                                                                                                                                               
term “failure” has been used for identifying enterprises in financial distress that have ceased 
the activity because of their inability to meet their financial obligations. 
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dimensions) concerns personal variables; the second group (H2, H3 and H4) refers to 
firm variables. 
 
(i) Personal characteristics 
 
Differences among entrepreneurs may account for variation in the degree to which they 
are overconfident and this article takes into account age, gender and education of the 
entrepreneur. It has been suggested that age is an important variable, with younger 
entrepreneurs exhibiting more overconfidence (Forbes, 2005; De Jorge Moreno, 
Castillo, and Masere, 2007). Jovanovic, (1982) and Forbes (2005) present one 
mechanism that explains this difference showing that the experiential learning of older 
entrepreneurs diminishes the tendency to overestimate the accuracy of their own 
knowledge. Forbes (2005) goes on to add that younger entrepreneurs have less time to 
recognize and correct such biases in themselves.  These findings, however, are not 
entirely consistent with later literature. For instance, Landier and Thesmar (2009) note 
that repeat entrepreneurs who have started at least one prior business are more 
optimistic than novice entrepreneurs. As a consequence, any relationship between 
overconfidence and experience is not taken forward and it is instead posited that young 
entrepreneurs tend to overestimate forecasts for their businesses and attribute chances of 
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success to themselves and chances of failure to others (Cooper, Woo and Dunkelberg 
1988). 
 
While both men and women have been shown to display overconfidence, this trait is 
particularly significant among men, especially when it comes to tasks that are perceived 
to be in the masculine domain (Beyer and Bowden 1997). In the entrepreneurial context 
this differing attitude has been observed in connection with bank lending where 
females, due to issues of self-confidence and a lower propensity for risk, are less likely 
to apply for bank loans than men (Triechel and Scott, 2006; Coleman, 2000). Freel, 
Carter, Tagg, and Mason (2012) progress this argument by establishing that there is no 
difference in approval rates for those female and male owned businesses that apply for 
loans but that a female led business is less likely to approach a bank with a weak loan 
application. The implication seems to be that, however misplaced, men are likely to 
have greater confidence, perhaps overconfidence, in the quality of their business and 
this is reflected in their propensity to apply for bank loans. This is a gender effect that is 
bound by structural assumptions and creates constraints to women’s choices and options 
(Marlow and Swail 2014). The argument above contributes to the notion that men are 
more likely to start a business than women (Blanchflower 2004) and, for these ventures, 
to be more risky (Yardanova and Boshnakova 2011). 
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The level of educational attainment is also included in the analysis as it is known to 
influence entrepreneurial leadership (Kropp, Lindsay and Shoham, 2008), contribute to 
a venture’s ability to survive and grow (Colombo and Grilli 2005; Saridakis, Mole and 
Storey 2008) and have a positive impact upon the degree and quality of planning in 
small firms (Gibson and Cassar 2002). In terms of overconfidence, previous research 
found that education can make people more aware of judgmental heuristics and biases 
(Lichtenstein and Fischoff, 1977). Koellinger, Minniti and Schade (2007) prove that 
more educated entrepreneurs show lower levels of overconfidence. 
 
The arguments presented identify some grounds for a potential impact of the different 
personal entrepreneurial characteristics upon levels of overconfidence. This leads into 
the first hypothesis, in its different specifications: 
 
(H1) Variables associated with entrepreneurial characteristics have a significant 
effect in explaining entrepreneurial overconfidence: 
 
(H1a) Younger entrepreneurs will exhibit higher levels of overconfidence; 
 
(H1b) Male entrepreneurs are more overconfident than female 
entrepreneurs; 
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(H1c) High levels of educational attainment decrease entrepreneur 
overconfidence. 
 
(ii) Firm characteristics 
Entrepreneurial cognitions are the knowledge structures used to make assessments in 
starting and developing new ventures. While this concept has often been used with 
reference to the idiosyncratic knowledge and experiences of the individual, it is 
pertinent to explore the impact that team-based structures have upon the decision 
making process of a firm. Houghton, Simon, Aquino, and Goldberg, (2000), for 
example, find that teams are susceptible to bias and to an illusion of control that could 
affect their perception of risk. Specifically, two well-known cognitive biases affect 
teams: group thinking and risk shift. In both these cases homogeneous teams tend to 
take extreme and riskier decisions (Ruef, Aldrich and Carter 2003; Page-West 2007; 
Yaniv 2011). In particular, team integration is pivotal and changes to the entrepreneurial 
team have the potential to significantly affect the quality of the decision making process 
(Santoni, Fini, Grimaldi, and Wright, 2013). Nevertheless, research (Kugler, Kausel and 
Kocher 2012; Cheung and Palan 2012) has suggested that small groups often make 
more accurate decisions compared to an individual. Venture teams can broaden 
networks (Neergaard 2005), point out different perspectives on risks and opportunities 
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(Sniezek and Henry 1989) and assist in gathering new material to counterbalance and 
challenge the “taken for granted” perspective (Grandi and Grimaldi 2003). As such, 
there are synergistic gains to be developed from a team of founders that enhances the 
potential of the new venture through its collective efforts (Colombo and Grilli 2005). 
This article is able to take advantage of a sample of firms where ownership is 
concentrated in the hands of a single entrepreneur or shared among an entrepreneurial 
team to assess the impact such structures have upon the accuracy of budgetary forecasts. 
This leads to our second hypothesis: 
 
(H2): Overconfidence is more pronounced in firms controlled by a single 
entrepreneur, rather than an entrepreneurial team. 
 
The use of financial management practices in SMEs across Europe is limited as the 
costs associated with the commitment of internal resources and the development of 
management skills is thought to outweigh the contribution such information can make 
to firm performance (Collis and Jarvis 2002). As a consequence, it is argued that 
forecasts and budgets are significantly more prevalent among larger firms than small 
and, particularly, micro firms (ACCA 2010; Digital4Executives 2010). Ciambotti, 
Aureli and Giampaoli (2012) provide some qualitative analyses for Italy and suggest 
that entrepreneurs consider automated information systems useful for designing 
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effective strategies but are reluctant to fully adopt them as a consequence of myopic 
cost-benefit evaluations. It is therefore suggested that micro firms are less likely to 
employ automated information systems to assist with strategic decision-making (Levy, 
Powell, and Yetton, 2001) and in particular, an integrated accounting or budgetary 
control system when making financial forecasts (Ismail and King 2014). However, very 
few businesses are so small or so insular that they can avoid reporting on a regular basis 
and Collis and Jarvis (2002) suggest that the majority of small firms adopt some 
accounting practices that include formal methods of planning and control. It is normally 
a process that is undertaken by the entrepreneur with the support of an accountant. As a 
consequence, and without a formal accounting or budgetary control system, 
entrepreneurs often rely on heuristic forecasting methods to provide information to their 
accountant, which are quicker and cheaper to implement, but prone to cognitive bias 
that can lead to sub-optimal outcomes (Alvarez and Busenitz 2001; Cassar and Gibson 
2007; Hmieleski and Baron 2009). 
Following the argument proposed by Morrell and Ezingeard (2002), this article 
hypothesises that, by adopting and developing information systems, entrepreneurs might 
obtain significant benefits in terms of efficiency via the reduction of bias in the 
prediction of future activity. It follows that the presence of these systems will weaken 
the relationship between the individual traits and overconfidence. We therefore 
formulate the following hypothesis: 
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(H3) The use of an accounting or budgeting control system reduces 
overconfidence. 
 
The ability of an entrepreneur to anticipate how the firm will perform in the market is a 
fundamental component of the decision to start a new business. The connection between 
entrepreneurial decisions about the future and overconfidence may explain, in part, the 
high failure rate of new business owners (Koellinger, Minniti and Schade 2007).  As the 
business develops, forecasts will be challenged and the survival of a firm depends upon 
such forecasts being revised, as argued by Trevelyan (2008). Overconfidence among 
entrepreneurs may lead to the deployment of heuristic methods that can undermine the 
planning process both in the initial phases and in any subsequent revisions (Frese 2007; 
Trevelyan 2008). This article tests whether entrepreneurs who set overconfident 
forecasts have a higher propensity to fail. While it is understood that failure can be 
interpreted in a number of ways (Ciampi and Gordini 2009; Ucbasaran et al. 2010; 
Wennberg and DeTienne 2014; Jenkins and McKelvie 2016), this article follows the 
perspective that the closure of the activity due to the inability to face financial 
commitments is a strong indicator of economic failure. Therefore: 
 
(H4) Overconfidence increases the probability of failure in entrepreneurial firms. 
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Identifying a measure of entrepreneurial overconfidence 
In the entrepreneurial context, previous literature has employed well-established 
psychological scales to identify the presence of overconfidence (Busenitz and Barney 
1997; Trevelyan 2008). While these scales are tried and tested, they are liable to bias as 
they rely upon the self-reporting of information by the entrepreneur in response to 
questions about their own attitudes toward events aimed at measuring their risk 
propensity. This article presents a novel within-firm measure of overconfidence 
computed as the difference between estimated and actual results for three variables 
identified as important in determining a firm’s performance (Ciampi and Gordini 2013): 
EBITDA, a performance measure for the income generated by a firm’s core business; 
owner equity, a proxy for an entrepreneur’s holding in a firm; and cost of debt and other 
related costs borne by a firm taking a loan. This construct is operationalised by 
assuming that an entrepreneur is overconfident when the forecasts for EBITDA and 
equity are above the actual figures and forecasts for borrowing costs are below those 
actually incurred. Data have been conveniently collected to isolate the contribution of 
automated systems to the generation of forecasts. In some cases, the access to 
automated information systems could be facilitated by an external accountant whose 
service is limited to the provision of technology in support of the entrepreneur’s 
decision-making process, without substituting for the entrepreneurial judgement in 
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generating forecasts. In line with Forbes (2005), any variations are referred to as higher 
or lower levels of overconfidence. 
 
Data set and methodology 
The data set includes balance sheet and budget information provided by three Italian 
chartered accounting firms on 203 micro and small non-financial firms
2
 operating in the 
Piedmont Region, in North West Italy. Initially, 246 firms were asked to participate in 
the research but 43 were excluded as they refused to waive the accountant/client 
privilege. The final sample of 203 firms, 82.5 percent of the initial population, provided 
data relating to the end of fiscal year 2012. 
Micro and small firms are a very important segment of the Italian economy and while 
the Small Medium Enterprise (SME) sector as a whole is broadly aligned to the 
European average, the subset of small and micro firms shows a significant difference in 
terms of number of enterprises, number of employees and value added contribution (see 
Table 1). These figures highlight how important the micro sector is to the Italian 
economy. While there is no comparable dataset for the Piedmont region, figures for 
employment (45.8 percent of the workforce employed in micro-firms and 21.1 percent 
small firms) suggests a similar contribution to the regional economy (ISTAT 2013). In 
                                                 
2 According to the Italian National Institute for Statistics (ISTAT), firms with less than 10 employees are 
defined as “micro enterprises” and firms with 10 to 49 employees as “small firms”. As a general practice 
in empirical works on the Italian context, both micro and small firms are referred to as “small firms” and 
jointly analyzed as a homogeneous ensemble (see for instance Bartoli, Ferri, Murro and Rotondi, 2014). 
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Italy, however, this segment of the economy has been hit hardest by the difficult 
economic circumstances post 2008 with the total stock of small companies falling by 
15% between 2008 and 2013 compared to only 5% for the SMEs sector as a whole 
(ISTAT 2013). Given the importance of micro and small firms to the Italian economy 
and the relatively high documented failure rates (Liedholm and Mead 2013; European 
Commission 2014), this article offers germane information on the role that 
overconfidence may play in negatively affecting upon firm performance. 
 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Despite the prevalence of micro and small firms in the Italian economy, they remain 
relatively under-researched and little is known about their forecasting and budgetary 
practices due to the difficulties in accessing raw data. The dataset used in this article is 
unique and, to our knowledge, no previous study in this research field has used a similar 
source of data. In testing the hypotheses, three control variables, the age of the firm, its 
size and the industry sector in which it operates, were considered. The extant literature 
would suggest that a firm is at greatest risk during its early years due to the “liability of 
adolescence” (Bruderl and Schussler 1990; Fichman and Levinthal 1991). It is possible 
that a lack of experience, inherent within young firms, leads to overoptimistic forecasts 
(Coad, Segarra, and Teruel 2013). Firm size has also been found to have an inverse 
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relationship with failure, with larger firms benefiting from a broader range of skills that 
can mitigate any overconfident attitudes (Jovanovic 1982). In addition, we seek to 
control for any differences created by sectorial conditions by differentiating between 
manufacturing, commercial and service industries (Short, McKelvie, Ketchen and 
Chandler, 2009). 
 
The final dataset contains the following three groups of variables for the year-end 2012 
(detailed in Table 2): 
(i) Personal characteristics of the entrepreneur: variables related to the basic 
demographic information for each respondent, including age (agedm and young), gender 
(gender) and educational level (highedu); 
(ii) Firm characteristics: the existence of an accounting or budgeting control system 
(sys), the industry in which the firm operates (manufacturing, commerce, services), firm 
size (size, as measured by the number of employees) and age (firmage). The dataset also 
includes two further characteristics. The first concerns the ownership structure of the 
firm (entralone), signalling firms in the Italian legal form “Società unipersonale”, which 
only has one shareholder. The second gives information on the viability of the firm in 
the near future, captured by data on failure up to April 2014, designated by the variable 
failure. 
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(iii) Entrepreneurial overconfidence: three variables measure entrepreneurial 
overconfidence, namely the percentage difference of EBITDA (diffebitda), the 
percentage difference of equity (diffequity) and the percentage difference of borrowing 
costs (diffbcosts). More precisely, overconfidence is computed as the percentage 
difference between what was set in the budget (forecast) and what was observed in the 
final balance sheet (actual), as per equation [1]: 
 
𝐷𝑖 =  
𝐹𝑖−𝐴𝑖
𝐴𝑖
         [1] 
 
where Fi represents the budget forecasted values for firm i, Ai represents the balance 
sheet actual results for the same firm i and Di represents the relative variation of forecast 
against actual results. Forecasted and actual values refer to EBITDA, equity and 
borrowing costs so that, in the article, Di is represented by the variables diffebitda, 
diffequity and diffbcosts.  If entrepreneurs do not systematically over- or under-estimate 
their actual figures, then Di is, on average, equal to zero and forecasts are considered to 
be unbiased. 
 
To investigate the determinants of overconfidence in SMEs, we first provide some 
descriptive statistics about dependent and control variables. Then, we present a 
regression of the three indicators for overconfidence, diffebitda, diffequity and diffbcosts, 
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over a set of independent variables capturing the characteristics of the entrepreneur and 
the firm. In addition, the article investigates whether overconfidence in estimating those 
indicators influences the probability of firm failure (variable failure). 
 
Results 
There are 203 firms in the sample with 102 entrepreneurs having the sole responsibility 
for the administration and management of the venture, while the remaining 101 firms 
are controlled by a plurality of shareholders. Firm size ranges between one and twenty-
six employees and, on average, a firm has been in business for sixteen years, with the 
youngest firm established for two years and the oldest for forty-five years. Reflecting 
the literature (Levy et al. 2001; Ismail and King 2014), only forty-nine firms (24 percent 
of the total) are found to use an accounting or budgetary control system with the 
majority relying on personal judgment and heuristics. In terms of the personal 
characteristics of entrepreneurs, 141 out of 203 are male (an accurate reflection of the 
population according to Bonte and Piegeler 2013), with an average age of forty-eight 
years and with a diverse level of educational attainment (49 hold a middle school 
diploma, 99 a high school diploma and 61 an undergraduate or graduate degree). In 
reviewing the potential for entrepreneurs to be overconfident, the findings indicate that 
over 85% of forecasts for EBITDA, equity and borrowing costs are better than those 
actually achieved by the firm. 
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[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Figure 1 represents the average values of the percentage differences between forecasts 
and actuals for EBITDA, equity and borrowing costs. In the interpretation of results, an 
increase in the variables diffebitda and diffequity has to be read “negatively”, as it 
implies that the value of EBITDA and equity (that are measures of firm wealth) had 
been overestimated. Similarly, a decrease in the variable diffbcosts has to be read 
“negatively”, because it implies that borrowing costs had been underestimated in the 
forecasts. On average, EBITDA is overestimated by 11.6 percent, meaning that there is 
a substantial difference between the results that were forecasted and those actually 
attained and that this difference has become evident within a 12-month period between 
the forecast being made and the final balance sheet being compiled. For example, in 
absolute values, an average firm expecting to generate an EBITDA of 100,000 euros 
actually generates an EBITDA of 88,400 euros. This difference is significantly different 
from zero (t (202) = -17.27; p < 0.01). Similar differences were found for equity, which 
is overestimated by 8.5 percent (t (202) = -13.82; p < 0.01) and borrowing costs, which 
were 9.1 percent higher in the balance sheet than in the budget (t (202) = -14.48; p < 
0.01). The standard errors of the three variables diffebitda, diffequity, diffbcosts 
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(highlighted by the whiskers in Figure 1) indicate the relative stability of these results 
across the sample and signifies a bias that is quite homogeneous among firms. 
 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Table 3 shows the pairwise Pearson correlations between the dependent, the 
independent and control variables included in the models. The level of correlation 
between the variables (agedm, young, gender, highedu, entralone, sys, firmage, size, 
manufacturing, commerce, services) is always below 0.7 thus suggesting a low risk of 
multicollinearity. 
 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
In order to detect the determinants of overconfidence across a range of firm goals 
(Anderson 2010), the study presents different regression models for each indicator. 
Table 4 presents the OLS regression of the measure of overconfidence in the estimation 
of EBITDA, equity and borrowing costs (dependent variables diffebitda, diffequity and 
diffbcosts respectively). Overconfidence variables are first regressed upon all the 
personal and firm variables that are expected to influence them on the basis of the 
previously listed hypotheses, namely young, gender, highedu, entralone, sys, size, 
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firmage (models 1, 3 and 5). Some of these variables turn out not to be significant and 
subsequently, according to a step-wise regression approach, they are excluded from the 
analysis in order to narrow the list of sources of overconfidence and isolate their 
marginal effect (models 2, 4 and 6). All regressions include sector dummies, which 
turned out not to be significant in the estimates. 
 
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Taking the results shown in tables 3 and 4 together, the evidence to support hypothesis 
1 is mixed. Entrepreneur age (H1a) appears to have very little effect upon 
overconfidence in forecasting financial data, except when the entrepreneur is less than 
35 years old (young) and, in that case, only with reference to the forecasting of equity 
(by 3.2 percent on average). The impact of gender (H1b) and educational attainment 
(H1c) is more apparent as this is negative and significant in all specifications, all other 
variables being constant, indicating a deflationary effect on the difference between 
forecast and actual by 3.4 percent for gender and by 3.2 percent for highedu. When 
exploring the impact of ownership structure and the single entrepreneur (entralone) 
upon overconfidence (H2), the regression identifies that entralone significantly affects 
borrowing costs only, with a marginal effect of 3 percent. A far stronger effect is found 
when analysing the impact of control systems (H3), which is significantly found in all 
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specifications and quantified in a reduction of overconfidence by 3.6 percent on average, 
all other variables being constant.  
The evidence from the correlation analysis shows, as expected, a strong positive 
correlation between the control variables size and firmage, and both potentially have an 
impact upon overconfidence. Findings from the regression analysis however identify 
only size as significant, with larger firms exhibiting lower levels of overconfidence for 
EBITDA and equity (by approximately 0.3 percent, on average). Contrary to 
expectations, the age of the company (firmage) turns out not to be significant. 
 
The correlation table also provides preliminary evidence that the likelihood of failure 
(failure) is positively correlated with the existence of a single founder (entralone) and 
negatively associated with the age of the entrepreneur and the firm (agedm and firmage, 
respectively). In addition, overconfidence in the forecast of all financial indicators 
EBITDA, equity and borrowing costs (diffebitda, diffequity, diffbcosts) is correlated 
with the likelihood of failure, indicating first support for hypothesis (H4).  
 
Table 5 reports the stepwise probit regression results for the likelihood of failure and 
identifies that overconfidence in the estimation of equity (variable diffequity) and 
EBITDA (variable diffebitda) is associated with the decision of a firm to file for 
financial distress. Each regression in Table 5 includes an estimation that uses only one 
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determinant of overconfidence at a time, due to the high multicollinearity between the 
overconfidence measures (see Table 3). The effect that marginal variations in 
overconfidence have on the probability of default is equal to 0.87 for differences in 
equity and to 0.58 for differences in EBITDA. Interestingly, the entrepreneur’s level of 
education (highedu) and the company’s age (firmage) significantly reduce the likelihood 
of default. No association is found for borrowing costs (diffbcosts). 
 
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Robustness checks 
In order to rule out the possibility that overconfidence and failure are conditioned by 
previous firm conditions, we replicated the step-wise regression approach followed to 
obtain the estimates in Table 4 by including the values of EBITDA in 2011 and 2012 
(alternatively) as additional regressors. EBITDA showed a similar pattern in 2011 and 
2012, ranging from a minimum of -140,000 euros to a maximum of 870,000 euros, with 
a standard deviation of 162,798 euros in 2011 and from -221,000 euros to 919,000 euros 
with a standard deviation of 162,354 euros in 2012. All estimates remained virtually 
unchanged and, quite interestingly, EBITDA in both years does not significantly 
influence overconfidence or the likelihood of failure, meaning that the model does well 
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in isolating the effect that personal and firm characteristics exert on the entrepreneurial 
propensity to overestimate performance. 
Although information on the homogeneity and the dimension of the entrepreneurial 
team was not available, we further explored the role of a team compared to that of sole 
entrepreneurs by controlling the estimates for the single entrepreneur’s or the 
entrepreneurial team’s tenure, i.e. for the time they have continuously been leading the 
firm. It is worth noting that tenure captures a different characteristic than firmage. 
Variable firmage is defined as the number of years elapsed since the year of the 
company’s incorporation, tenure is the number of years the entrepreneur or the 
entrepreneurial team have been in charge as of the end of 2012 and better captures 
managerial ability. On average, single entrepreneurs have been running the firm for 9.6 
years while teams for 12.2 years: none of the two variables significantly influence the 
entrepreneurial overconfidence and the likelihood of failure
3
. 
 
Discussion 
Our results add to the emerging debate related to the hubris model of entrepreneurship. 
While previous literature has suggested that entrepreneurs are inclined to make 
overconfident forecasts that stem from cognitive bias and the use of heuristic methods, 
                                                 
3
 The significance of all other regressors is also unchanged after the inclusion of entrepreneurial and team 
tenure, with one exception: the parameter of entralone turns out to be insignificant also in the estimate of 
diffbcosts and not only for diffebitda and diffbcosts. Instead, when including EBITDA from previous 
years, no significant effect on the other regressors emerges. Estimates are available upon request. 
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there is limited information on the propensity for entrepreneurs to act in an 
overconfident manner or the characteristics that influence such behaviour. 
 
The empirical analysis, in contrast to previous work, relies upon the budget forecasts 
and actual results provided by accountants rather than information generated from self-
reported attitudinal surveys (Busenitz and Barney 1997; Trevelyan 2008). This enables 
us to adopt a novel measure for overconfidence, computed as the variance between 
actual and estimated values for three economic indicators (EBITDA, equity and 
borrowing costs) and provides an opportunity to investigate the impact of 
overconfidence upon entrepreneurial behaviour and the determinants and consequences 
of such conduct. 
 
The results indicate that overconfidence is a significant entrepreneurial trait exhibited 
by 85% of the sample and our findings also show a clear association between 
overconfidence and failure. Entrepreneurs that overestimate EBITDA and equity in their 
budgetary forecasts are more likely to file for financial distress. Importantly, the 
findings also support previous research (Gibson and Casser 2002; Kropp, Lindsay and 
Shoham 2008) that highlights the importance of education in reducing the propensity 
for overoptimistic forecasts and in improving a firm’s chances of survival. 
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Analysing the results in more detail, we first investigated the impact that entrepreneurial 
characteristics, namely age, gender and education, have upon the formulation of 
forecasts. As Forbes (2005) suggests, older entrepreneurs should, on average, have 
experienced more occasions in which the inaccuracy of their own knowledge has 
become apparent and, guided by past experience, should reduce their tendency to be 
overconfident in their estimates. Our findings provide little evidence to support this 
assertion, with age (agedm) offering no relationship with overconfident forecasts for 
EBITDA, equity or borrowing costs. To explore this issue further, a second variable 
was employed that divided the sample between those entrepreneurs who are thirty-five 
or under and those over thirty-five (young). This second variable provides evidence to 
suggest that younger entrepreneurs (<35) are more likely to overestimate equity 
(approximately by 0.3 percent) but no significant differences were found for EBITDA 
or borrowing costs, thus providing limited support for the stated hypothesis (H1a). A 
factor pertinent to this debate is the degree to which age is a proxy for relevant 
experience. Ucbasaran et al. (2010) conclude that “entrepreneurial experience offers 
opportunities to reduce the likelihood of subsequently reported comparative optimism 
but this depends on the nature of the experience” (p. 552). It is possible that older 
entrepreneurs have not lived through the appropriate experiences and that hubris, in the 
form of hope for the future, is stronger than any learning that has been derived from past 
activity. This finding lends support to the arguments presented by Trevelyan (2008) that 
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suggests that overconfidence can adversely affect firms throughout its development and 
that age itself is not sufficient to explain experience. More nuanced information about 
the entrepreneur’s past experience would be needed to fully explore this relationship. 
 
With reference to gender, the hypothesis (H1b) is strongly supported with the evidence 
indicating that women tend to be more accurate than men in predicting the budget 
values of EBITDA, equity and borrowing costs. Even if few entrepreneurs in this 
sample are women (62 out of 203), this effect is consistent across all specifications and 
it is more pronounced when the dependent variable is the percentage variance in equity, 
where the marginal impact is approximately 3.5 percent. These results confirm previous 
findings and suggest that women provide more reliable estimates of future financial 
positions for firms they control (Barber and Odean 2001; Yardanova and Boshnakova 
2011). 
 
However performance is measured, previous research points to a positive and 
significant relationship between the level of general education and entrepreneurial 
performance (Acs, Arenius, Hay and Minniti, 2004; van der Sluis and van Prag, 2004). 
A possible factor underpinning this relationship concerns the role that education 
performs in building entrepreneurial confidence to develop skills (Koellinger, Minniti, 
and Schade 2007). While this might suggest that education levels are positively 
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associated with overconfident forecasts, previous research (Lichtenstein and Fischoff 
1977) has found that education mitigates such behaviour, making people more aware of 
judgmental heuristics and bias in their decision-making. The influence that education 
has upon the creation of overconfident estimates is therefore ambiguous. Our results 
suggest that a high level of education increases an entrepreneur’s ability to more 
accurately forecast the future EBITDA, equity and borrowing costs of the firm. 
Hypothesis (H1c) is therefore supported. Taking into account the positive correlation 
between education and the use of an accounting or budgetary control system (sys), we 
suggest that education enables an entrepreneur to reflect on the limits associated with 
heuristic methods and have the confidence/capability to employ more sophisticated 
forecasting techniques, also found to mitigate against overconfidence. 
 
In the general business literature (Collins and Clark 2003; Helfat 2015), there is interest 
in understanding and linking specific team attributes to firm performance. Although not 
as well established, a similar stream has emerged in the entrepreneurship literature 
(Ensley, Pearson, Amason and Allen, 2002; Lubatkin, Simsek, Ling and Veiga, 2006). 
Critical to such arguments is the premise that the management of entrepreneurial 
ventures is often a shared effort (Page-West 2007). Our dataset can be divided into 
firms where entrepreneurs identified themselves as solely responsible for financial 
forecasts and firms where such responsibility was coordinated between an 
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entrepreneurial team. The results indicate that individual entrepreneurs are more likely 
to overestimate forecasts for borrowing costs but no significant differences are found in 
the accuracy of EBITDA or equity predictions. Differentials in borrowing costs may be 
derived from unexpected changes in the market conditions for existing debt contracts, or 
from cash flow problems that require new financing arrangements or further overdraft 
facilities. As a consequence, hypothesis (H2) is only partially supported. It may well be 
the case that hubris is as much a feature of entrepreneurial teams as it is with individual 
entrepreneurs; as Page-West (2007) acknowledges, teams are not removed from the 
problems faced by small firms so “one would expect teams, like individuals, to rely on 
mental models or schema as a heuristic aid to interpretation and decision making” (p. 
80). 
 
Previous literature has identified the disadvantages of using heuristic methods upon 
which to base future estimations (Baron 2004; Mitchell et al. 2002) and encourages 
entrepreneurs towards more formal systems that are expected to limit bias and 
overconfidence. It is recognised that SMEs are less likely to use such methods (ACCA 
2010; Collins and Jarvis 2002) and this is reflected in our sample with only 49 firms out 
of 203 making use of an accounting or budgetary control system. Our results indicate 
that the presence of such a system is highly influential in accurately predicting EBITDA 
and is also significant in minimizing the difference between planned and actual for both 
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borrowing costs and equity. Therefore, when internal planning is managed using an 
accounting or budgetary control system, forecasts are more accurate than when the 
estimation process relies on heuristic methods, thus confirming Hypothesis (H3). 
 
The final hypothesis investigated associations between overconfidence and business 
failure. Our results support Hypothesis (H4) and indicate that overconfidence in the 
forecasting of EBITDA and equity are strongly associated with the failure of a firm. 
These findings provide empirical evidence to underpin assertions in the extant literature 
that have indicated the probability of such a relationship (De Meza and Southey 1996; 
Koellinger, Minniti, and Schade 2007). It should be noted that our sample does not 
include very early stage firms, which may be at greatest risk from the “liability of 
adolescence” (Bruderl and Schussler 1990; Fichman and Levinthal 1991). This is 
relevant as the variable firmage, not identified as a factor influencing overconfidence, is 
instead an important condition that protect against failure. Therefore, the inclusion of 
firms that are less than two years old is likely to strengthen the existing relationship 
linking overconfident forecasts with firm failure. Overconfidence, however, can be 
mitigated by education and the deployment of accounting or budgetary control systems. 
We would propose that education helps to raise entrepreneurial awareness of the 
limitations of heuristics and encourages the effective utilisation of accounting or 
budgetary control systems curbing the natural hubris of the entrepreneur. Education and 
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accounting or budgetary control systems therefore limit the propensity of a firm to file 
for financial distress. 
 
Conclusions 
A hubris theory of entrepreneurship models how overconfidence can influence the 
decision to start a firm and its performance once established. For early-stage 
entrepreneurs, overconfidence could be beneficial and provide them with the energy and 
enthusiasm to pursue opportunities in difficult contexts (Koellinger, Minniti and Schade, 
2007; Robinson and Marino 2015). However, once firms are well established, 
overconfidence has the potential to adversely affect firm performance, as entrepreneurs 
pursue challenging goals with limited resource (Hayward, Shepherd and Griffin 2006). 
As a consequence, hubris theory concludes that such overconfidence embedded in an 
entrepreneur’s psychology increases the likelihood of failure among entrepreneurial 
firms (De Meza and Southey 1996; Koellinger, Minniti and Schade 2007). While hubris 
theory is well documented in the literature, our understanding of why entrepreneurs 
exhibit more overconfidence than non-entrepreneurs is a moot point. This article has 
addressed the suggestion that the entrepreneurial context appeals to individuals that are 
inclined to employ heuristics in their decision-making and that such attitudes lead to the 
formulation of overconfident forecasts. While there is limited information on the 
propensity for entrepreneurs to act in an overconfident manner, our findings identify 
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that approximately 85% of entrepreneurs sampled provided financial estimates that were 
better than those actually attained. Hubris is therefore embedded in the overwhelming 
majority of the sample population. More so, it is embedded in entrepreneurial firms that 
are more than two years old and, on average, have been in business for sixteen years; 
this suggests that such attitudes hold over time. The predisposition for entrepreneurs to 
be overconfident is only an issue if, as previously asserted by many researcher (De 
Meza and Southey 1996; Hayward, Shepherd and Griffin 2006; Koellinger, Minniti, and 
Schade 2007), it has a negative impact upon performance. Our evidence provides 
empirical support for these assertions and shows that overconfidence in the forecasts of 
EBITDA and equity are strongly associated with an entrepreneur’s decision to file for 
financial distress. It is possible to decrease entrepreneurial overconfidence by increasing 
the levels of educational attainment achieved by entrepreneurs and through the use of 
accounting or budgetary control systems. While it is virtually impossible to control for 
all the determinants of failure, our findings point to education helping entrepreneurs to 
understand the limitations of heuristic methods and providing the confidence and 
competence to effectively use accounting or budgetary control systems. The findings 
also indicate that overconfidence is less prevalent among women business owners. 
 
Our study has some limitations that give rise to opportunities for further research. First, 
this is a highly contextualised study using evidence drawn from Piedmont in Northern 
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Italy with the support of three accounting firms that collect their data. While the 
independent variables do confer confidence in the findings, it would be appropriate to 
extend the research to firms that do not use accounting firms and broaden the 
geographical reach of the study. However, the positive impact of accounting or 
budgeting systems in reducing forecasting biases in small companies seems likely to 
transfer across countries where the adoption of such systems is heterogeneous and 
generally poor (Levy et al. 2001; Cassar and Gibson 2007; Hmieleski and Baron 2009; 
Ismail and King 2014). Secondly, future research might include cognitive trait scales to 
validate the conceptual assumption of the linkage between overconfident entrepreneurs 
and entrepreneurs who set overconfident forecasts. Thirdly, our sample does not include 
firms recently established and it is possible that this is a sub-sector of the small and 
micro firms segment in which firms that are most susceptible to hubris and perhaps least 
equipped to survive any negative impacts that result from such attitudes. Incorporating 
very early stage firms may provide greater evidence of the relationship between 
overconfidence and business failure. Finally, a sensitivity analysis that goes beyond the 
main trends might unclose punctual overconfidence thresholds where overconfidence is 
ruinous. A possible approach to test for this effect would be the floodlight analysis 
(Spiller, Fitzsimons, Lynch and McClelland 2013). 
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Figure 1. Average percentage differences between the budget values and actual 
balance sheet values for the variables: EBITDA, equity and borrowing costs 
 
Average percentage differences between budget values and actual balance sheet values: 
diffebitda is the percentage difference between forecasted and actual EBITDA, diffbcosts is the 
percentage difference between forecasted and actual borrowing costs, diffequity is the 
percentage difference between forecasted and actual equity. The percentage differences are 
computed as per Equation [1]. Number of firms: 203. 
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Table 1: A Comparison of Industry Structure – Italy and the EU 
 Number of 
Enterprises (%) 
Number of 
Employees (%) 
Value Added (%) 
Firm 
dimension 
Italy EU Italy EU Italy EU 
Micro  94.8 92.4 45.8 29.1 30.4 21.6 
Small  4.6 6.4 21.1 20.6 21.3 18.2 
Medium 0.5 1.0 12.7 17.2 17.8 18.3 
Large 0.1 0.2 20.4 33.1 30.5 41.9 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Adapted from the European Commission (2014) Enterprise and Industry – Italy, SBA Fact 
Sheet. 
 
  
44 
 
Table 2: Definition of Variables (N=203) 
Category Abbreviation Definition Mean St. Dev. 
Personal 
characteristics 
of the 
entrepreneur 
agedm Entrepreneur’s age 45.167 13.013 
young Dummy variable equal to 1 if 
the entrepreneur or the 
entrepreneur is younger than 
35, 0 otherwise 
0.236 0.425 
gender 
  
Dummy variable equal to 1 if 
the entrepreneur is a women 
and 0 otherwise 
0.305 0.461 
highedu Dummy variable equal to 1 if 
the entrepreneur holds a degree 
(undergraduate or higher), 0 
otherwise 
0.300 0.460 
Firm 
characteristics 
entralone Dummy variable equal to 1 in 
case of single founder, 0 
otherwise 
0.502 0.501 
sys Dummy variable equal to 1 if 
there is an integrated 
accounting or budgetary 
control system, 0 otherwise 
0.241 0.429 
failure Dummy variable equal to 1 if 
the firm have ceased the 
activity for financial distress up 
to April 2014, 0 otherwise 
0.172 0.379 
manufacturing Dummy variable equal to 1 if 
the firm is in the mechanical 
industry, 0 otherwise 
0.295 0.457 
commerce Dummy variable equal to 1 if 
the firm is in the commercial 
industry, 0 otherwise 
0.295 0.457 
services Dummy variable equal to 1 if 
the firm is in the services 
industry, 0 otherwise 
0.408 0.492 
size Number of employees 6.374 5.059 
firmage Number of years since the 
firm’s constitution 
16.320 10.461 
Entrepreneurial 
overconfidence 
diffebitda Percentage difference between 
actual and forecasted EBITDA 
0.116 0.091 
diffequity Percentage difference between 
actual and forecasted equity 
0.085 0.076 
diffbcosts Percentage difference between 
actual and forecasted 
borrowing costs 
0.091 0.080 
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Table 3: Pearson correlation 
 agedm young gender highedu entralone sys failure manuf. comm. services size firmage diffebitda diffequity diffbcosts 
agedm 1               
young -0.11*** 1              
gender 0.031 -0.04 1             
highedu -0.19*** 0.09 0.20** 1            
entralone -0.23*** 0.25*** -0.15** -0.23*** 1           
sys -0.04 0.01 -0.07 0.16** -0.06 1          
failure -0.19*** 0.053 0.01 0.07 0.14** -0.07 1         
manuf. 0.20*** -0.13* -0.154** -0.07 -0.01 -0.14** -0.12* 1        
comm. 0.03 -0.08 0.06 0.16** -0.07 0.19*** -0.01 -0.42*** 1       
services -0.22*** 0.20*** 0.08 -0.09 0.07 -0.05 0.12* -0.54*** -0.54*** 1      
size 0.15** -0.19*** -0.02 0.05 -0.35*** 0.04 -0.10 0.03 0.04 -0.06 1     
firmage 0.35*** -0.27*** 0.01 0.02 -0.26*** 0.14** -0.21*** 0.15** 0.04 -0.17** 0.29*** 1    
diffebitda 0.030 0.04 -0.19*** -0.29*** 0.26 -0.24*** 0.15** 0.01 -0.04 0.02 -0.23*** -0.19*** 1   
diffequity -0.08 0.19*** -0.24*** -0.23*** 0.27*** -0.16** 0.20*** -0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.21*** -0.16* 0.86*** 1  
diffbcosts 0.04 0.072 -0.22*** -0.27*** 0.28*** -0.23*** 0.12* -0.05 0.05 0.01 -0.17** -0.16** 0.85*** 0.85*** 1 
Pairwise Pearson correlations between variables.  
*** denotes significance at 1 percent level, ** at 5 percent level, * at 10 percent level. 
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Table 4: Overconfidence in EBITDA, Equity and Borrowing Costs 
Estimation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables diffebitda diffequity diffbcosts 
       
young -0.005  0.026* 0.030** 0.003  
 (0.015)  (0.014) (0.014) (0.015)  
gender -0.032*** -0.034*** -0.035*** -0.036*** -0.034*** -0.030*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) 
highedu -0.041*** -0.044*** -0.026** -0.028*** -0.032*** -0.029*** 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
entralone 0.020  0.016  0.025** 0.033*** 
 (0.013)  (0.011)  (0.011) (0.010) 
sys -0.045*** -0.046*** -0.028** -0.027** -0.042*** -0.038*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.011) (0.015) (0.011) 
size -0.002** -0.004*** -0.002** -0.003*** -0.001  
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)  
firmage -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Constant 0.168*** 0.176*** 0.110*** 0.121*** 0.120*** 0.101*** 
 (0.019) (0.011) (0.016) (0.010) (0.017) (0.010) 
Sector dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 203 203 203 203 203 203 
R-squared 0.220 0.199 0.200 0.185 0.222 0.187 
OLS estimation of the determinants of overconfidence (White's heteroskedasticity-consistent 
standard errors in parentheses).  
*** denotes significance at 1 percent level, ** at 5 percent level, * at 10 percent level. 
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Table 5: Overconfidence and the likelihood of failure 
 
(1) (2) 
Variables failure 
   
diffebitda 2.530*  
 (1.383)  
diffequity  3.866** 
  (1.511) 
firmage -0.036*** -0.037*** 
 (0.0106) (0.0109) 
highedu -0.411* -0.418* 
 (0.248) (0.248) 
Constant -0.880*** -0.923*** 
 (0.303) (0.283) 
Sector dummies yes yes 
Observations 203 203 
Stepwise probit regression (with standard errors correction). The dependent variable is failure, a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm ceased its activity for financial distress in the period 
between December 2012 and April 2014 and zero otherwise. 
*** denotes significance at 1 percent level, ** at 5 percent level, * at 10 percent level. 
 
 
